WHY IS INFLATION SKEWED? A DEBT AND VOLATILITY STORY A B STR ACT This paper studies the patterns of inflation skewness in 56 countries. Monthly data suggests that inflation is posicively skewed. We investigate linkages between skewness and nonlinearity, showing that concavity (convexity) will lead to negative (positive) skewness if the independent variable is symmetrically distributed. We construct a public finance model for a developing country that uses inflation tax and external borrowing as the residual means for fiscal financing. The model predicts a convex dependency of inflation on output. whem inflation skewness depends positively on inflation volatility, and external debt difficulties magnify the skewness. We conclude the paper with an assessment of the patterns of inflation between 1979-1993 for the 56 countries. Overall, the patterns are consistent with the predictions of the model.
Recent decades have been turbulent for Latin American countries and other developing countries, a period associated with high and volatile inflation, terms of trade instability, and external debt problems. A question that deserves further attention is the impact of the resultant volatility on macroeconomic performance. Recent studies have shown that macroeconomic volatility impacts negatively on investment and growth.'
The economic explanation for these patterns, however, deserves further investigation.
The purpose of this paper is to focus narrowly on one aspect of volatility -its impact on patterns of inflation. Figure 1 plots the volatility/skewness patterns of monthly inflation in a sample of 56 countries during the period of 1979-1993. 2 Table I summarizes the avenge skewness, variance and the mean of inflation rates and inflation tax rates, demonstrating that inflation is positively skewed. 3, Our paper will trace possible economic reasons that explain this pattern.
In section 1 we identify the linkage between skewness and non-linearity. We See Rodrick (1991) , Barro (1991) , Aizenman and Marion (1993) , Flausrnann (1994) , Dornbusch and Edwards (1994) and the references therein. 2 Our sample was restricted by the availability of monthly data. It is composed of 18 OECD countries, and 38 developing countries. 3 The inflation tax rate is defined by 11(1 + I), where I is the inflation rate. This ratio measures the implicit tax rate imposed by inflation on money balances, and is bounded between values close to zero and one. The advantage of focusing on the inflation tax rate is that it is a stationary variable that has a simple public finance interpretation. 4
The skewness reported in this study is defined by the third central moment divided by the cube of the standard deviation. While inflation is positively skewed both in the OECD countries and the developing countries, skewness is lower for the first group -the average inflation skewness for OECD and developing countries is 0.92 and 1.7, respectively. The avenge inflation tax rate skewness for OECD and developing countries is .868 and 1.02, respectively. 
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The confidence level reported in this table is 95%.
show that if an independent random variable is symmetrically distributed, concavity (convexity) leads to a negative (positive) skewness of the dependent variable.
In section 2 we describe a public finance model of inflation tax and external debt that may lead to a convex dependency of inflation on output shocks. The model is designed to account for several features specific to developing countries. We consider a government that finances its activities and services its outstanding external debt by direct taxes, printing money, and external borrowing. Future output is stochastic, and the access of the country to the international credit market is limited by its creditworthiness, which in turn is related to the tax capacity of the government.6 Both inflation tax and external borrowing are assumed to be associated with excess burden.
We characterize the pattern of inflation and external borrowing, and derive the association of inflation and output We show that if the tax capacity is large relative to the needed fiscal resources, inflation rate will be low (possibly zero), and direct taxes will be used to finance government expenditure. If the fiscal revenue needs exceed the tax capacity, both the inflation tax and external borrowing will be used to finance current fiscal outlays. Further increase in fiscal needs (or a drop in tax capacity) exhausts the ability of the country to increase its external borrowing, as the credit ceiling is reached.
In these circumstances inflation tax is used as a residual means of taxation, leading to a convex dependency of inflation on output. This convexity is magnified in the presence of external credit ceilings, or a large accumulation of foreign debt.
6
In countries where the private sector does not have access to the international credit market, most external borrowing is either done by the government, or guaranteed by it. Hence, the external debt should be viewed as a liability of the government, and the tax capacity is one important indicator regarding the government's ability to service its debt.
Section 3 turns to an empirical assessment of the skewness of inflation throughout the last 15 years. Overall, the patterns are consistent with the predictions of the model described in Section 2.
Before turning to the paper, it is useful to place it in the context of the relevant literature. The importance of inflation tax as the residual means of financing is well established in the existing literature.7 A topic that deserves further attention focuses on the degree to which limited access to the international credit market affects inflation tax.
The skewness of price adjustments, in the presence of an inflationary trend, has been derived in models that focused on menu costs and nominal rigidity.8 Our discussion ignores menu cost factors, focusing instead on public finance aspects of inflation and external debt as the residual means of financing government expenditure. While we do not negate the potential importance of menu costs and nominal rigidities, these considerations are not unique to developing countries. The linkages between output volatility, inflation and external debt, however, are more pronounced for developing countries, and may be crucial for explaining the patterns of inflation taking place in these countries.9
On the optimality of using inflation tax as a residual, see Calvo and Guidotti (1992) , Calvo and Leiderman (1992) and the references therein. 8 See Tsiddon (1991) and Ball and Mankiw (1994) . In these models shocks that raise firms desired relative price trigger larger price responses than shocks that lower the desired relative price, as in the second case the inflation will reduce the relative price without any nominal price adjustment.
Industrialized countries are well integrated with the international credit market, and their tax system is well developed. Hence, they may be able to adjust to real shocks without relying on the inflation tax.
1.
Skewness and non-linearity
Frequent applications of certainty equivalence in macroeconomics may induce one to overlook the impact of non-linearity. The purpose of this section is to establish the linkage between non-linearity and skewness when certainty equivalence does not hold. A possible measure of skewness is the third moment of a function, defined by the expected value of the cube difference between the function and its mean.
Consider the example provided in Figure 2 , plotting a concave function y = f(x).
Suppose that x follows a symmetric three states distribution: respectively, satisfying a1 > a2. Direct calculation reveals that for the example considered above
where E is the expectation operator.
Had y = f(x) been a linear function (like NBC' in Figure 2 ), volatility would not affect its mean (equals to f(x0)), and the third moment of f(x) would bezero. For a concave function, however, volatility reduces the mean. This effect in conjunctionwith the fact that point A is further below point B than point C is above B, induces a negative third moment. Applying the logic of figure 2, it follows that for a convex function, the skewness is positive. In Appendix A. we apply a second order Taylor approximation showing that:
Claim 1:
Let y = f(x) be a twice differential function, and let x be a random variable distributed symmetrically around xij with a small support where f' Cv) 0 , then sign E[{f(x) -Qf(x)]}3] = sign f". Hence, concavity (convexity) is associated with a negative (positive) skewness.
2.
Inflation skewness, productivity shocks and external debt.
We turn now to a public finance model that links output to inflation. The model will enable us to predict the patters of non-linearity in the association of output and inflation. The model is characterized by the following assumptions, motivated by the experience of developing countries in recent decades:
Inflation tax and external borrowing are the residual means of financing government expenditure, meeting any gap between the fiscal revenue needs and the fiscal funding available from other sources.
• Other taxes (like income and sale taxes) are characterized by their relative rigidity the costs of adjusting the tax rates to the realized state of nature are too high.
• Foreign borrowing is limited by the credit worthiness of the country, which in turn is linked to its tax capacity. When the external credit ceiling is reached, the inflation tax remains the only residual means of fiscal financing.
• Both the inflation tax and foreign borrowing are associated with excess burden.
We start with the construction of a simple framework capturing these assumptionsa model of a one traded good in a two period example. Appendix B extends the logic of the model to a more general n period framework Ui 00). To fix ideas, we consider the case where all external borrowing is done by the government.
The outstanding foreign debt at the beginning of the first period is B1. The demand for money is characterized by a cash in advance constraint:'0 10 Allowing for a variable velocity will complicate exposition, but will not modify the key results, as is illustrated in Appendix B. In fact, a negative dependency of the demand for money on the inflation rate tends to increase the convexity of the inflation output schedule (See Appendix B for further discussion).
(4)
where M stands for nominal balances, P is the price level, and Q denotes output. The government has two means of taxation: the inflation tax, and a proportional income tax at a rate of x. Throughout the analysis we take this tax as given, reflecting the fiscal capacity of the government In addition, the government may have limited access to the international credit market, borrowing D1 to be returned in period 2 with a contractual interest rate R (denominated in foreign currency units). The access to the international credit market and the contractual interest rate are determined by risk neutral creditors who demand an expected return equal to the risk free rate, denoted by r.
The budget constraint facing the government in period us given by
where stands for the nominal money balances 'inherited' from the previous period, and stands for government expenditure on goods and services, assumed to be exogenously given. The right hand side of (5) corresponds to the fiscal revenue net of expenditure, being the sum of direct taxes, revenue from printing money, and external borrowing, minus expenditure. Applying (4) and (5) we infer that
P-P where = 0 is the inflation tax, defined to be bounded between zero and one. P1 We assume that inflation introduces deadweight losses, the consumption cost of which is iQ(g)2 The coffesponding first period consumption (C) is given by:
The second period is modeled as the terminal period: at that period external debt is settled. The consumption at that period equals the difference between production and debt payment. To simplify presentation we assume that in the terminal period the demand for money is zero. Appendix B extends the mode] to a general n period framework. In addition to the cost of inflationary finance mentioned above, we assume that external debt may induce deadweight losses, due either to adverse incentive effects associated with debt overhang, or to more frequent spells of non-cooperative behavior.
Suppose that the only uncertainty in period 1 concerns the second period output.
There are two independent sources for this uncertainty: an exogenous and an endogenous one. The exogenous uncertainty reflects the state of nature, being determined by factors like weather, terms of trade, etc. We summarize this uncertainty by a distribution f(Y2), where stands for the potential output. The endogenous uncertainty stems from the possibility of production disruption due to non-cooperative behavior among domestic competing pressure groups (like labor and capital or other potential rival groups). Or alternatively, due to a drop in effort induced by debt overhang. We model this by assuming that non-cooperative behavior, or debt overhang, will induce a percentage GNP drop of r, occurring with probability p. This probability depends positively on the external debt burden: I0 (1+r)Dj (7) p=p(z), where z = , and p>O for z>O.
The value of z measures the exposure of a country to external debt relative to the anticipated output. The presumption is that a larger exposure increases the frequency of production disturbances, due to several possible reasons. First, if external debt accumulation leads to debt overhang, it will reduce effort resulting in a similar reduced form equation. Alternatively, cooperation may be in short supply in bad times, leading to spells of production disturbances due to conflicts among rivaling groups. A higher debt burden is equivalent to an adverse shock, reducing the net resources available for consumption or investment, and encouraging thereby opportunistic behavior.t2,13
1 For a discussion on debt overhang, see Krugman (1988) , Classnes (1988) and the references therein. See Berg and Sachs (1988) for a statistical analysis that highlights the role of exposure to external debt in explaining rescheduling. 12 The presumption is that adverse shocks will increase the benefit of opportunistic behavior as it increases the marginal evaluate of extra resources and reduces the planing horizon, diminishing the value of future penalties associated with non-cooperation. For a model capturing these feature, see Aizenman (1993) . For a war of attrition interpretation of high inflation see Alesina and Drazen (1991) . 13 Another way for linking external debt with productivity disturbances is to recognize that a partial default on external debt may lead to a drop in international trade due to trade embargo or to the elimination of trade credits. In these circumstances, t measures the output effects of a default, and p represents the default probability.
Assuming that the resolution of both types of uncertainty occurs simultaneously, the expected GNP equals:14
The sovereign debt is modeled in a manner akin to Helpman (1989) . where the country repays its external debt each period up to a fraction x of its GNP. where x corresponds to the tax capacity.15 Hence, the supply of credit facing the country in period one is determined by the condition:
This condition defines implicitly the supply of credit facing the country. The maximum external credit supported by (9) defines the external credit ceiling, denoted by 1)3.
The expected second period consumption equals the difference between the expected second period output and the expected external debt repayment:
The representative consumer is risk neutral, discounting second period consumption at a rate of r. The utility of the representative decision maker is given by:
14
A similar analysis applies if nature moves first, although the resultant equations are more involved.
In this fonnulation we implicitly assume that creditors have the bargaining power to induce the debtor to repay up to the tax capacity.
(11)
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The government sets the first period inflation tax and borrows so as to maximize the expected net present value of consumption, subject to the proper constraints. This problem can be reduced to the following constrained maximization:
The policy maker determines the inflation tax and external borr owing so as to maximize the expected utility of the representative agent subject to two constraints: the government budget constraint (the multiplier of which is A, representing the shadow cost of government expenditure), and the external credit ceiling (the multiplier of which isp, representing the shadow benefit of extending the external debt ceiling).
There are three possible regimes. If the present tax capacity suffices to cover all government outlays, the inflation tax will not be used (it1= 0), and any tax surplus will be saved (leading to D1 <0)16 In this regime, both external borrowing and inflation tax are redundant. In the second regime tax capacity falls short of revenue needs. An internal equilibrium is characterized by the optimal application of both inflation and external borrowing. If the credit ceiling is not binding, the second regime is 16 Equivalently, the government may rebate the excessive tax to the consumer. characterized by equating the marginal cost of both means of financing. Formally, this yields the following first order conditions: a. The position of the output-inflation curve depends on the outstanding debt, B1. Point A (Figure 3) corresponds to the output level that induces inflation, switching from the first to the second regime. Applying the budget constraint we infer that the output G+B+kQb at point A is given by Q1 = Hence, a larger external debt accumulatrnn or a smaller tax capacity shifts point A to the right, from the solid curve to the dashed one.18 A larger real interest rate applied to the debt induces a similar shift. Figure 3 highlights the possibility that a rigid direct tax structure and the exposure to country risk yields a non-linear, convex output/inflation association.
Applying our discussion from section 1 to Figure 3 enables us to conclude:
• If the independent variable is output, and if its distribution is symmethc around the mean, a large enough volatility will lead to a positive skewness of inflation. The resultant skewness increases with volatility.
-Debt accumulation or a raise in the international interest rate will shift the curve to the right, increasing thereby the convex region, and raising the inflation skewness.
• A higher anticipated output volatility leads to a higher expected inflation and thereby to a higher interest rate.
Applying the first order conditions it can be shown that at point A sta=0 .2k]>0 dQ1 3. Some evidence --inflation skewness and external debt
We turn now to evaluate some evidence regarding the impact of volatility and external debt difficulties on inflation skewness. Ideally, one wishes to use the volatility of GDP, terms of trade, government revenue and all the other relevant variables to test the model described above. Unfortunately, we do not have monthly information regarding this variable. Instead, we proceeded indirectly. First, we used annual data to investigate the skewness patterns of the real GDP of the 56 countries in the sample.
With the exception of one country, we can not reject the hypothesis that the real GDP is not skewed.19 This result enables us to apply Figure 3 to infer that external debt difficulties and higher volatility of inflation should increase inflation skewness.
Next, we proceeded by dividing the sample into three periods: before the debt crisis (February 1979 -July 1982 , periods during the debt crisis (August 1982 -December 1989 and the aftermath (January 1990 -December 1993 . Table 2 reports a summary of the average values of monthly inflation skewness.
variance, and mean throughout the sample. Table 3 provides similar information for the inflation tax rate. Overall, throughout the years characterized by the debt crisis, it is evident that skewness, volatility and rates of inflation moved together, increasing throughout the sample. While this is not a formal test of the model, these results are consistent with the interpretation that the adverse shocks leading to the debt crisis moved countries from the flat portion of the inflation-output schedule (Figure 3 ) to the upward sloping convex part, where volatility induces skewness and where external credit ceilings are worsening the inflationary impact of adverse real shocks. Our model predicts that even if some countries regain limited access to the international credit market, the past accumulation of external debt continues to bite -as these countries continue to operate along the convex part of the inflation-output schedule. 19 The confidence level used is 95%. 1979-1982 1982-1990 1990-1993 Significantly The confidence level reported in this table is 95%. 
Concluding remarks
Our model can be extended to study the impact of volatility on exchange rate regimes and on the patterns of financial markets. For example, adverse fiscal shocks, affecting developing countries, induce a regime switch from a fixed exchange rate regime to a crawling peg regime or to other regimes that accommodate the induced inflation. Our discussion predicts that the impact of volatility on expected inflation and thereby on the interest rate depends on the sophistication of the tax system. and the ability of the country to use the international credit market. A given increase in output volatility will induce a larger interest rate increase in countries the tax structure of which is less developed, and whose external debt is large -. as both factors increase the convexity of the output inflation schedule. This underscores the importance of broadening the tax base, suggesting that fiscal restructuring will have important effects on the patterns of interest rates.
Appendix A
The purpose of this Appendix is to derive Claim I. We focus on approximating a skewness measure, p , defined by the third central moment divided by the cube of the standard deviation:
Consider a function y = f(x), and let x be a symmetric random variable the mean and standard deviation of which are , , respectively. We assume that the support of x is small enough to enable the use of a second order Taylor approximation around x0.
First, note that (AS) sign (p3) = sign f,'(x0).
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In making this inference we make use of the fact that for a small support and a symmetric distribution, EI(x -x0)4 -(a1)4] > 0. Notice also that we implicitly assume that f(x0) 0.
the number of periods, the economic principles are the same as in the two-period example: the split of financing between inflation and external borrowing is done so as to equate the marginal cost of extra dollar raised. If the credit ceiling binds in the first period, the inflation is determined according to equation (14). If the fiscal revenue from direct taxes suffices to cover the fiscal outlays, the inflation tax is zero. For an internal equilibrium, where both the inflation tax and external borrowing are used, we determine the optimal configuration of fiscal instruments by applying the above first order conditions in conjunction with the budget constraints.
We conclude this appendix by reviewing the case where inflation affects the velocity of circulation. Suppose that the demand for money at time tis given by M = k1Q, where k depends negatively on expected inflation. The problem facing the policy maker in period 1 can be restated as 
